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Abstract
This paper focuses on a class of continuous-time controlled Markov chains with time-
inconsistent and distribution-dependent cost functional (in some appropriate sense). A
new definition of time-inconsistent distribution-dependent equilibrium in closed-loop
sense is given and its existence and uniqueness have been established. Because of the
time-inconsistency, it is proved that the equilibrium is locally optimal in an appropriate
sense. Moreover, it has been shown that our problem is essentially equivalent to an
infinite-player mean-field game with time-inconsistent cost.
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1
1 Introduction
Because of the wide range of applications in existing and emerging areas such as control
engineering, biology and ecology, communication systems, social networks, and finance and
economics, stochastic control problems have been studied extensively since last century.
Recently, time-inconsistent control problems have attracted increasing attention. In contrast
to a time-consistent problem, for a time-inconsistent problem, it is impossible to find an
optimal control or strategy based on the dynamic programming principle. In economics
and financial models, there are many reasons for time-inconsistency. For example, if the
cost functional or reward is non-exponential discounting (see [27]) or it is of mean-variance
form, the problem is time-inconsistent. It can be seen that time-inconsistency appears in
a wide variety of applications; see [1, 2, 8, 9] and references therein. One of the ideas to
deal with time-inconsistency is to find a strategy, which is locally optimal only. After the
breakthrough using equilibria was introduced in [4, 3, 5, 27], many works are published
concerning time-inconsistent problems; see the survey paper [25] and the references therein.
Generally speaking, the strategies can be divided into two categories, open-loop [3] and
closed-loop [27]. In the open-loop setup, the main effort is devoted to deriving a local
maximal principle (or variational principle) by the rule of local optimality. In contrast,
in the closed-loop one, through the investigation on an N -player game, one can derive a
time-inconsistent Hamilton-Jacobi equation to determine a time-inconsistent strategy which
verifies a local optimality [27]. For similar closed-loop problems, time-inconsistent control
problems with recursive cost functions are considered in [24] and time-inconsistent control
problems with switching states are considered in [23, 18]. In the closed-loop problems, one
of the difficulties lies in the first-order regularity of the viscosity solution to the Hamilton-
Jacobi (HJ for short) equation (or it is required that the HJ equation exists a unique classical
solution). Therefore, the stochastic differential equations are assumed to be non-degenerate
in the most of previous works.
In this paper, we consider a controlled continuous-time Markov chain with time-inconsistent
and distribution-dependent cost functional in a closed-loop setup. That is, not only does the
cost functional depend on a non-exponential discounting factor, but also depends on the dis-
tribution of the Markov chain. Compared to the time-inconsistent distribution-independent
problem, the distribution-dependence of the cost functional brings some new features and
difficulties. For example, the classical dynamic programming is not applicable and the strat-
egy is not state-dependent only when finding a optimal control. To overcome the difficulties
due to the distribution-dependence, the first idea is to lift the dynamic into the space of
probability measures on which one can derive an HJ equation using the Bellman’s principle.
Then using mass-transport theory, one can prove the existence and uniqueness of the vis-
cosity solutions (e.g., see [21, 20] for time-consistent problems). While for time-inconsistent
problems, it is required that there exists a unique classical solution of the HJ equation on
the space of probability measures to identify the time-inconsistent strategy. This is an even
harder problem to deal with. Thus we present a different approach in this paper.
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An alternative idea to deal with distribution-dependence can be paralleled from the
recent developments in the mean-field game theory (see [16, 17, 14, 15, 10, 11, 12, 13]). In a
mean-field game problem, one considers a backward Hamilton-Jacobi equation coupled with
a forward transport equation on the space of probability measures. Using the fixed-point
theory, one can derive a mean-field equilibrium, which is essentially a Nash equilibrium point.
Applying the similar idea to the control problem with time-consistent and distribution-
dependent cost functional, the first step is to solve a classical HJ equation which is concluded
from the classical optimal control of system given a guiding (fixed) process ρ(·) in the cost
functional. A feedback control can be determined if the HJ equation is “regular enough”.
Then the second step is to verify that the guiding process ρ(·) coincides with the distribution
law of the dynamics using the feedback control. If the two-step verification is fulfilled,
the feedback control is called a mean-field equilibrium. One can see that the mean-field
equilibrium is essentially a fixed point using such definition. However we have to mention
that the equilibrium is not an optimal strategy in general even for the time-consistent cases.
In this paper, we considered continuous-time and finite-state controlled Markov chains
with time-inconsistent distribution-dependent cost functional using a similar idea to mean-
field game theory. We present a new definition for time-inconsistent mean-field equilibrium,
which verifies a local optimality in some appropriate sense. Then we can prove the exis-
tence and uniqueness of the time-inconsistent mean-field equilibrium under some appropri-
ate conditions. Moreover, we show that the time-inconsistent mean-field equilibrium found
is equivalent to an equilibrium for a mean-field game of infinite-many equivalent players
with time-inconsistent cost functional. Previous works on time-inconsistent distribution-
dependent systems include [19, 22, 28]. To the best of our knowledge, most of the papers
are concerned with a special class of linear stochastic differential equations with quadratic
costs. There are few papers concerned with the theory on continuous-time controlled Markov
chains with time-inconsistent and distribution-dependent cost. The paper aims to fill this
gap.
The paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2, we introduce some notation together
with certain preliminary results for controlled Markov Chain. Section 3 introduces the time-
inconsistent mean-field equilibrium and prove the existence and uniqueness. Section 4 shows
that our problem is equivalent to an infinite-player mean-field game with time-inconsistent
cost. Finally some concluding remarks are made in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
Let M = {1, · · · , m} and T = [0, T ]. Denote by M be the set of all possible functions
defined on M equipped with the sup-norm ‖ · ‖M. Set
C([0, T ],M) :=
{
θ : T×M 7→ R
∣∣ θt(i) is continuous w.r.t. t}
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and
D([0, T ],M) :=
{
θ : T×M 7→ R
∣∣ θt(i) is right-continuous with left-limit w.r.t. t} .
Let P be the collection of all probability measures on M equipped with metric d(·, ·) defined
by
d(ρ, γ) :=
m∑
i=1
|ρ(i)− γ(i)|.
Denote by C([0, T ],P) be the set of all continuous P-valued curves on T. Let U be the space
of actions equipped with the metric |·, ·|U and v0 be a fixed element in U . Let U be the set
of all possible maps from M to U equipped with the following metric
dU(u, u
′) = sup
i∈M
|u(i), u′(i)|U .
2.2 Controlled Markov Chain
In this paper, we consider a finite-state controlled Markov chain with generator Qvt =
[qvt (i, j)]M×M satisfying
(2.1)
dµt
dt
= µtQ
v
t , t ∈ T, v ∈ U,
where the state space is M and the action space is U .
To make sure Qvt is a generator of a Markov chain, we define the admissible action set
for state i being
Ut(i) := {v ∈ U : q
v
t (i, ·) is a generator},
where qvt (i, ·) is a generator in the sense that q
v
t (i, j) ≥ 0 if j 6= i and
∑m
j=1 q
v
t (i, j) = 0.
Throughout the paper, we assume that Ut(i) is not empty and measurable under the topology
of U induced by the metric |·, ·|U .
Let the set of all admissible strategies on time-interval [t0, T ] be
L1([t0, T ],U) := {π
∣∣π : (s, i) ∈ [t0, T ]×M 7→ πs(i) ∈ Ut(i) with
∫ T
t0
|πs(i), v0|Uds <∞}.
Define a subset D([t0, T ],U) ⊂ L
1([t0, T ],U) by
D([t0, T ],U)
:= {π ∈ L1([t0, T ],U) : πt(i) is right-continuous with left-limit w.r.t. t for each i ∈M}.
We can define a map φt : L
1([0, T ],U) 7→ L1([t, T ],U) by
(φt[π])s(i) := πs(i), for i ∈M, t ≤ s ≤ T.
Given any π ∈ L1([0, T ],U), we write µt0,ρ,pit as the solution of (2.1) at time t with initial
data ρ at time t0 under the strategy π. If the initial data ρ = δx, i.e., the Dirac measure
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concentrated on the point x, we write µt0,x,pit = µ
t0,δx,pi
t . Especially the initial time t0 will be
omitted if t0 = 0. Now we pose the following assumptions to guarantee the regularity of the
dynamic (2.1).
Assumption (A)
(A1) The admissible action set U· is right continuous with left limits. That is,
Ut(i) = lim
ε→0+
Ut+ε(i) and Ut−(i) := lim
ε→0−
Ut+ε(i) exists.
(A2) qv· (i, j) is right continuous with left limit in that for any vn ∈ Ut+εn(i) with limit
v ∈ Ut(i) as εn → 0
+,
lim
n→∞
qvnt+εn(i, j) = q
v
t (i, j).
For any vn ∈ Ut+εn(i) with limit v ∈ Ut−(i) as εn → 0
−,
qvt−(i, j) := lim
n→∞
qvnt+εn(i, j) exists.
(A3) There exists constants K1, κ1 > 0 such that for any t ∈ [0, T ] and i, j ∈M ,
(2.2)


|qvt (i, j)− q
v′
t (i, j)| ≤ κ1|v − v
′|U , for v, v
′ ∈ Ut(i);
sup
j∈M
sup
v∈Ut(j)
|qvt (i, j)| ≤ K1.
Remark 2.1. Note that qvt (i, j) is right continuous with left limit w.r.t. t from (A1) and
(A2) and qvt (i, j) is Lipschitz with respect to v from (A3). Thus the existence and uniqueness
of the solution of (2.1) given any π ∈ L1([0, T ],U) holds directly. Note that such assumptions
are stronger than necessary for the existence and uniqueness of the solution. The reason we
assume such assumption is to conclude the following proposition to be used for the control
problem.
Proposition 2.2. Under Assumption (A), for any π ∈ D([0, T ],M), q
pi·(i)
· (i, j) is right
continuous with left limit for any fixed i, j ∈M .
To proceed, we present some regularity results about (2.1) first. The proof of which can
be found in [26] (Page 19, Theorem 2.5).
Proposition 2.3. Under Assumption (A), for any π ∈ L1([0, T ],U), let
(2.3) Ppit0,t1 = exp
{∫ t1
t0
Qpiss ds
}
:= (ppit0,t1(i, j))M×M .
The unique solution of (2.1) is µρ,pit = ρP
pi
0,t, i.e., for each j ∈M ,
µ
ρ,pi
t (j) =
m∑
j=1
ppi0,t(i, j)ρ(i).
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If π ∈ L1([0, T ],U) for any h ∈ M, then
(2.4) lim
ε→0+
1
ε
( m∑
j=1
h(j)µt,i,pit+ε (j)− h(i)
)
=
m∑
j=1
h(j)q
pi(i)
t (i, j) holds for a.e. t ∈ T.
Moreover, if π ∈ D([0, T ],U), (2.4) holds for all t ∈ T.
Because of the Lipschitz-dependence of the transition rate (which depends on the strate-
gies), the following lemma indicates that the solution of dynamic (2.1) is Lipschitz-dependent
on the strategies as well.
Lemma 2.4. Under Assumption (A), given any two admissible strategies π, π′ ∈ L1([0, T ],U)
and ρ, γ ∈ P, it follows that
(2.5) d(µρ,pit , µ
γ,pi′
t ) ≤ d(ρ, γ) + κ1
∫ t
0
dU(πs, π
′
s)ds.
Proof. Noting that
∑m
j=1 p
pi
t (i, j) = 1, simple calculation yields
(2.6)
d(µρ,pit , µ
γ,pi
t ) = d(ρP
pi
t , γP
pi
t )
≤
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
|ρ(i)− γ(i)|ppit (i, j)
≤ d(ρ, γ).
By (2.2), for any ε > 0, there exists a δε > 0 small enough (independent of t) such that when
0 ≤ t ≤ δε,
(2.7)
d(µρ,pit , µ
ρ,pi′
t ) = d(ρP
pi
t , ρP
pi′
t )
≤
M∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣
M∑
i=1
ρ(i)[ppit (i, j)− p
pi′
t (i, j)]
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ (1 + ε)κ1dU(πs, π
′
s)ds.
By (2.6),
(2.8)
d(µρ,pit , µ
γ,pi′
t ) ≤ d(µ
ρ,pi
t , µ
ρ,pi′
t ) + d(µ
ρ,pi′
t , µ
γ,pi′
t )
≤ (1 + ε)κ1
∫ t
0
dU(πs, π
′
s)ds+ d(ρ, γ).
For any t ∈ [δε, T ], using (2.7) and (2.8), we have
d(µρ,pit , µ
γ,pi′
t ) ≤ d(µ
ρ,pi
t−δε
, µ
γ,pi′
t−δε
) + (1 + ε)κ1
∫ t
t−δε
dU(πs, π
′
s)ds
By simple recursions and the arbitrariness of ε > 0, one can easily see that
d(µρ,pit , µ
γ,pi′
t ) ≤ d(ρ, γ) + κ1
∫ t
0
dU(πs, π
′
s)ds.
The proof is complete.
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3 Time-inconsistent Distribution-dependent Control Prob-
lem
In this section, we introduce the control problem that we are interested in and give the
definition of time-inconsistent equilibrium. Moreover, we prove the existence and uniqueness
of the time-inconsistent mean-field equilibrium under some general conditions. This section
is divided into several subsections.
3.1 Definition of Time-inconsistent Mean-field Equilibrium
In this subsection, we mainly introduce the definition of time-inconsistent mean-field equi-
librium for our control problem. We begin by defining the time-inconsistent distribution
dependent cost functional first.
Let the running cost and terminal cost rates be maps defined as{
f : T× T×M × U × P 7→ R+ by (τ, t, i, v, ρ) 7→ fτ,t(i, v; ρ),
g : T×M × P 7→ R+ by (τ, i, ρ) 7→ gτ (i; ρ).
In the paper, we are concerned with the following distribution-dependent time-inconsistent
cost functional with non-exponential discounting factor τ ,
(3.1) Jτ,t(ρ, π) :=
∫ T
t
m∑
j=1
fτ,s(j, πs(j);µ
t,ρ,pi
s )µ
t,ρ,pi
s (j)ds+
m∑
j=1
gτ (j;µ
t,ρ,pi
T )µ
t,ρ,pi
T (j)
and the corresponding value functional
(3.2) Vt(ρ, π) := Jt,t(ρ, π).
Here the J andV are distribution-dependent because f and g depends on the distribution
term as well. If f and g are distribution-independent, such problem reduces to a classical
time-inconsistent control problem.
As alluded to in the introduction, it is impossible to find a optimal strategy because
of the time-inconsistency. Thus we look for the time-inconsistent distribution-dependent
equilibrium. The definition is given as follows.
Definition 3.1. Given a priori νT ∈ C([0, T ],P), write
Jτ,t(i, φt[π]; νT) :=
∫ T
t
m∑
j=1
fτ,s(j, us(j); νs)µ
t,i,pi
s (j)ds+
m∑
j=1
gτ(j; νT )µ
t,i,pi
T (j)
and
Vt(i, φt[π]; νT) = Jt,t(i, φt[π]; νT).
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A pair (ρ, π) ∈ P ×D([0, T ],U) is called a time-inconsistent equilibrium for our distribution-
dependent cost if the following local-optimality holds,
(3.3)
lim sup
ε→0+
Vt(i, π
ε ⊕ φt+ε[π];µ
ρ,pi
T
)− Vt(i, φt[π];µ
ρ,pi
T
)
ε
≥ 0,
for any (t, i, πε) ∈ T×M ×D([t, t+ ε),U),
where the perturbed strategy πε ⊕ φt+ε[π] ∈ D([t, T ],U) is defined as
(
πε ⊕ φt+ε[π]
)
s
(i) :=
{
πs(i), t+ ε ≤ s ≤ T,
πεs(i), t ≤ s < t+ ε.
Remark 3.2. We note the following facts.
(1) Along the solution curve µρ,pi
T
, we have
Jτ,t(µ
ρ,pi
t , π) =
m∑
j=1
µ
ρ,pi
t (j)Jτ,t(j, φt[π];µ
ρ,pi
T
) and Vt(µ
ρ,pi
t , π) =
m∑
j=1
µ
ρ,pi
t (j)Vt(j, φt[π];µ
ρ,pi
T
).
(2) From the definition of a time-inconsistent equilibrium (ρ, π), we can see that there are
two steps to verify.
(a) Find the unique solution µρ,pi
T
of the dynamic (2.1) using (ρ, π).
(b) Using νT = µ
ρ,pi
T
as a priori curve, find the distribution-independent time-inconsistent
equilibrium strategy which verifies the local-optimality.
If such two-step recursion is fulfilled, one can see that (ρ, π) is a time-inconsistent mean-
field equilibrium. Thus we will adopt the fixed-point theory to prove the existence and
uniqueness of the time-inconsistent distribution-dependent equilibrium.
To proceed, we first present the following example to avoid some possible confusions.
Example 3.3. Suppose that the terminal cost in (3.1) is given by
gτ (i, ρ) = (i−
m∑
j=1
jρ(j))2.
Then
∑m
i=1 gτ (i, µT )µT (i) is the variance of the distribution µT . In this case, if we let
g˜τ (i, ρ) = i
2 − (
m∑
j=1
jρ(j))2.
∑m
i=1 g˜τ (i, µT )µT (i) is the variance of the distribution µT as well. Thus g and g˜ give the
same terminal functional in V. While in the process of deriving the fixed-point, the terminal
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conditions in the Hamilton-Jacobi equation will be different. As a consequence, the time-
inconsistent equilibrium will be different as well. Therefore it is natural to question which
of those is the correct one to use. In fact, in Section 4, we introduce a time-inconsistent
mean-field game with infinite-many equivalent players. We can clearly identify the correct
forms of f and g from the problem itself. Thus, generally speaking, the forms of f or g
depend on the model used.
3.2 Distribution-independent Equilibrium with a Priori νT
In this subsection, we derive the process to find a (classical) time-inconsistent equilibrium if
νT in the cost functional is given a priori. This is the step (b) from Remark 3.2. Essentially,
we are finding a time-inconsistent equilibrium of which the idea is taken from [27]. The
main effort is to find a time-inconsistent HJ equation derived from an N -player game. While
in our paper, we present the HJ equation and verify the required local-optimality directly.
Further details regarding the derivation of of the time-inconsistent HJ equation can be found
in [27]. We first present some assumptions.
Given u ∈ U , define an operator Qut :M 7→M by
Qut [h](i) :=
m∑
j=1
q
u(i)
t (i, j)h(j).
Assumption (B)
(B1) There exists f¯τ,t : M ×P 7→ R
+ and Ψt : M × U 7→ R
+ such that
fτ,t(i, v; ρ) = f¯τ,t(i; ρ) + Ψt(i, v),
and that Ψt(i, ·) is continuous on Ut(i) with
sup
i∈M
sup
0≤t≤T
sup
v∈Ut(i)
Ψt(i, v) < K1.
(B2) There exist constants K2, K3 ≥ 0 such that

0 ≤ f¯τ,t(i, ρ), gτ (i, ρ) ≤ K2,
|f¯τ,t(i, ρ)− f¯τ,t(i, ρ
′)|+ |gτ (i, ρ)− gτ(i, ρ
′)| ≤ K3d(ρ, ρ
′).
(B3) There exists a map ψt :M 7→ U such that for any h ∈ M,
ψt[h](i) := argmin
v∈Ut(i)
[
Ψt(i, v) +
m∑
j=1
h(j)qvt (i, j)
]
.
Moreover, For any h, h′ ∈M,
(3.4) dU(ψt[h], ψt[h
′]) ≤ κ2‖h− h
′‖M and lim
ε→0
|ψt+ε[h](i), ψt[h](i)|U = 0.
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Remark 3.4. The definition of ψt induces a map ψ : C([0, T ],M) 7→ L
1([0, T ],U) by
point-wise by defining
(ψ[θ])t(i) = ψt[θt](i).
Moreover, if θ ∈ D([0, T ],M), by Assumption (B), ψ[θ] ∈ D([0, T ],U).
Example 3.5. Here we present an example where Assumption (B) is true. Let
qvt (i, j) = αt(i, j) + βt(j)v
and the action set U = [−1, 1]. Suppose that Ψt(i, v) =
1
2
v2, αt(i, j) ≥ 0 if i 6= j and
m∑
j=1
αt(i, j) =
m∑
j=1
βt(j) = 0.
One can easily see that Ut(i) 6= ∅ since 0 ∈ Ut(i). If v, v
′ ∈ Ut(i), i.e.,
αt(i, j) + βt(j)v, αt(i, j) + βt(j)v
′ ≥ 0 for i 6= j,
then for any λ ∈ [0, 1]
αt(i, j) + βt(j)[λv + (1− λv
′)] ≥ 0 for i 6= j.
This proves that
λv + (1− λ)v′ ∈ Ut(i), for any λ ∈ [0, 1],
i.e., Ut(i) is a convex subset. It can also be seen that Ut(i) is closed. Thus Ut(i) is a closed
subinterval of [−1, 1], and as a result,
ψt(i) = argmin
v∈Ut(i)
[v2
2
+ v
m∑
j=1
h(j)βt(j)
]
is well-defined by the strong convexity. Moreover, if βt(i) is right-continuous with respect to
t, (3.4) holds directly.
Now we are ready to introduce the time-inconsistent HJ equation for our problem. Given
νT ∈ C([0, T ],P), consider the following time-inconsistent Hamilton-Jacobi equation,
(3.5)
{
∂tΘτ,t(i) + fτ,t(i, πt(i); νt) +Q
pit
t [Θτ,t](i) = 0
πt(i) = ψt[Θt,t](i), Θτ,T (i) = gτ (i; νT )
for any i ∈M.
Define Apit0,t1 :M 7→M by
(Apit0,t1h)(i) =
m∑
j=1
h(j)ppit0,t1(i, j)
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where ppit0,t1(j) is defined in (2.3). It is easy to see that (3.5) is equivalent to
(3.6)


Θτ,t =
∫ T
t
Apit,sfτ,s(·, πs(·); νs)ds+A
pi
t,Tgτ (·; νT )
πt(i) = ψt[Θt,t](i), Θτ,t(i) = gτ (i).
In view of the form of the HJ equation, formally we can conclude that the solution
Θ ∈ M [0, T ]2 where
M ([0, T ]2 := {Θ : (τ, t, i) ∈ T2 ×M 7→ Θτ,t(i) ∈ R
∣∣ Θτ,· ∈ C([0, T ],M) for each τ ∈ T}.
Note that it is not required Θt,t(i) being continuous in t, or even measurable. Let us look at
the following example.
Example 3.6. Let T1 be a non-measurable subset of [0, T ]. Let
Θτ,t = I(τ ∈ T1).
Obviously Θτ,t is continuous with respect t for each fixed τ . While Θt,t = I(t ∈ T1) is not a
measurable function.
Therefore, to guarantee the regularity of Θt,t, we assume the following conditions hold.
Assumption (C) f¯τ,t(i), gτ (i) are right continuous with left limit with respect to τ for each
(t, i) ∈ T×M .
With such an assumption, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.7. Under Assumptions (A), (B), (C), given any νT ∈ C([0, T ],P), there
exists a solution pair (Θ, π) ∈ M [0, T ]2×D([0, T ],U) for (3.5) with Θt,t(i) is right-continuous
with left-limit for each i ∈M . As a consequence,
πt(i) = ψt(i,Θt,t) ∈ D([0, T ],U).
Proof. The proof is based on the fixed-point theory. Since νT is given a priori, we omit νT
in the proof. Given two θ, θ′ ∈ D([0, T ],M), let (Θ, π), (Θ′, π′) be the solutions of{
∂tΘτ,t(i) + fτ,t(i, πt(i)) +Q
pit
t [Θτ,t](i) = 0
π = ψ[θ], Θτ,T (i) = gτ (i)
for any i ∈M,
and {
∂tΘ
′
τ,t(i) + fτ,t(i, π
′
t(i)) +Q
pi′
t
t [Θ
′
τ,t](i) = 0
π′ = ψ[θ′], Θτ,T (i) = gτ(i)
for any i ∈M.
By (3.4), ∫ T
t
dU(πs(i), π
′
s(i))ds ≤ κ3
∫ T
t
‖θs − θ
′
s‖Mds.
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and we have the contraction inequality
(3.7)
‖Θτ,t −Θ
′
τ,t‖M
≤
∫ T
t
‖Apit,sfτ,s(·, πs(·))−A
pi′
t,sfτ,s(·, π
′
s(·))‖Mds+ ‖A
pi
t,Tgτ −A
pi′
t,Tgτ‖M
≤ K
∫ T
t
dU(πs, π
′
s)ds ≤ κ3K
∫ T
t
‖θs − θ
′
s‖Mds.
Now we show that if θ ∈ D([0, T ],M), Θt,t is also right continuous with left limit. Then
we note that
‖Θt+ε,t −Θt+ε,t+ε‖M
≤ ‖Θt+ε,t+ε −Θt,t+ε‖M + ‖Θt,t+ε −Θt,t‖M
≤
∫ T
t
‖Apit,sft+ε,s(·, πs(·))−A
pi
t,sft,s(·, πs(·))‖Mds+ ‖A
pi
t,Tgt+ε −A
pi
t,Tgt‖M
+‖Θt,t+ε −Θt,t‖M.
Using Assumption (C) and letting ε→ 0+,
lim
ε→0+
‖Θt+ε,t+ε −Θt,t‖M = 0.
This proves that Θt,t is right continuous with respect to t. Similarly, Θt,t has a left limit
with respect to t.
Now we are ready to prove the existence and uniqueness of the solution by adopting
the fixed point theory. Given θ(1) ∈ D([0, T ],M), let Θ(1) be the solution of (3.5). Let
θ
(2)
t (i) = Θ
(1)
t (i) for each (t, i). By our claim, we know that θ
(2) ∈ D([0, T ],M). Then let
Θ(2) be the solution of (3.5) using θ(2). Recursively repeating such process, one can get a
sequence of functions {(θ(n),Θ(n)}. By (3.7), we have
sup
t≤s≤T
sup
0≤τ≤T
‖Θ(n)τ,s −Θ
(n+1)
τ,s ‖M
≤ κ3K(T − t)
∫ T
t
‖θ(n)s − θ
(n+1)
s ‖Mds
≤ κ3K(T − t) sup
t≤s≤T
sup
0≤τ≤T
‖Θ(n−1)τ,s −Θ
(n)
τ,s‖M.
As a result, T − t < δ for small δ > 0, there exists a limit pair (θ,Θ) with Θ ∈ M [T − δ, T ]2
and ∫ T
T−δ
|θs(i)|ds <∞.
For the whole time interval [0, T ], one can divide [0, T ] into [T, T − δ], [T − δ, T − 2δ], . . ..
Recursively from T to 0, one can see that there exists a unique solution pair (θ,Θ) ∈
D([0, T ],M)×M [0, T ]2. Moreover we have π = ψ[θ] ∈ D([0, T ],U).
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Proposition 3.8. For any νT ∈ C([0, T ],P), there exists a uniform constant κ2 (inde-
pendent of νT) such that
(3.8) 0 ≤ Θτ,t(i) ≤ κ2.
Proof. By Assumption (B2) and the representation of Θ in (3.6), (3.8) holds with some
uniform constant κ2 independent of the choice of νT.
Next, we prove that the strategy from (3.5) verifies the local-optimality (3.3).
Theorem 3.9. Under Assumptions (A), (B), (C), given a tuple (νT,Θ, π), where (Θ, π)
solves (3.5) with given priori νT, it follows that
lim inf
ε→0+
Vt(i, π
ε ⊕ φt+ε[π]; νT)− Vt(i, φt[π]; νT)
ε
≥ 0
for any (t, i, πε) ∈ T×M ×D([t, t + ε),U)
with πεt = u for any ε > 0.
Proof. Note that
Jt,t(i, π
ε ⊕ φt+ε[π], νT)
=
∫ t+ε
t
m∑
j=1
ft,s(j, π
ε
s(i); νs)µ
t,i,piε
s (j)ds+
m∑
j=1
Jt,t+ε(j, φt+ε[π]; νT)µ
t,i,piε
t+ε (j).
Therefore
Jt,t(i, π
ε ⊕ φt+ε[π], νT)− Jt,t(i, φt[π], νT)
=
∫ t+ε
t
m∑
j=1
(
ft,s(j, π
ε
s(i); νs)µ
t,i,piε
s (j)− ft,s(j, πs(j); νs)µ
t,i,pi
s (j)
)
ds
+
m∑
j=1
Jt,t+ε(j, φt+ε[π]; νT)
(
µ
t,i,piε
t+ε (j)− µ
t,i,pi
t+ε (j)
)
Since πε and π are right-continuous, it follows that
(3.9)
lim sup
ε→0
1
ε
[ ∫ t+ε
t
m∑
j=1
(
ft,s(j, π
ε
s(j); νs)µ
t,i,piε
s (j)− ft,s(j, π(s); νs)µ
t,i,pi
s (j)
)
ds
]
= ft,t(i, u(i); νt)− ft,t(i, πt(i); νt).
Note that Θτ,t(i) = Jτ,t(i, φt[π]; νT), we have
m∑
j=1
Jt,t+ε(j, φt+ε[π]; νT)µ
t,i,piε
t+ε (j)− Jt,t+ε(i, φt+ε[π]; νT)
=
m∑
j=1
Θt,t+ε(j)[δiP
piε
t,t+ε](j)−Θt,t(i)−
(
Θt,t+ε(i)−Θt,t(i)
)
=
m∑
j=1
Θt,t(j)[δiP
piε
t,t+ε](j)−Θt,t(i) +
m∑
j=1
(Θt,t(j)−Θt,t(j))
(
[δiP
piε
t,t+ε](j)− δi(j)
)
.
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Since πε, π are right-continuous and by Assumption (A),
(3.10)


lim
ε→0
1
ε
( m∑
j=1
Jt,t+ε(j, φt+ε[π]; νT)µ
t,i,piε
t+ε (j)−Θt,t(i)
)
= Qut [Θt,t](i)
lim
ε→0
1
ε
( m∑
j=1
Jt,t+ε(j, φt+ε[π]; νT)µ
t,i,pi
t+ε (j)−Θt,t(i)
)
= Qpitt [Θt,t](i).
As a result, by (3.9), (3.10) and the definition of πt(i) = ψt[Θt,t](i),
lim inf
ε→0
Jt,t(i, π
ε ⊕ φt+ε[π], νT)− Jt,t(i, φt[π], νT)
ε
= ft,t(i, u(i); νt)− ft,t(i, πt(i); νt) +Q
u
t [Θt,t](i)−Q
pit
t [Θt,t](i)
≥ 0.
The proof is complete.
3.3 Time-inconsistent Distribution-dependent Equilibrium
In this section, we use the following two-step recursion to prove the existence and uniqueness
of the time-inconsistent mean-field equilibrium.
Step-1: Given a ν
(1)
T
∈ C([0, T ],P) with initial ν
(1)
0 = ρ, let (Θ
(1), π(1)) be the solution
pair of (3.5).
Step-2: Using the strategy π(1), let ν
(2)
T
be the solution of the dynamic equation (2.1)
with initial ν
(2)
0 = ρ.
By recursively repeating Step-1 and Step-2, we can get a sequence of triples (ν
(n)
T
,Θ(n), π(n)).
Now we aim to prove such a sequence is convergent in an appropriate sense. We need the
following lemma.
Lemma 3.10. Under Assumptions (A), (B), (C), given νT, ν˜T ∈ C([0, T ],P), let (Θ, π)
and (Θ˜, π˜) be the solutions of (3.5) respectively. Then there exists a constant κ3 > 0 such
that
(3.11) sup
0≤t≤T
sup
0≤τ≤T
‖Θτ,t − Θ˜τ,t‖M ≤ κ3 sup
0≤t≤T
d(νt, ν˜t).
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Proof. Note that
‖Θτ,t − Θ˜τ,t‖M
≤
∫ T
t
‖Apit,sfτ,s(·, πs(·); νs)−A
p˜i
t,sfτ,s(·, π˜s(·); ν˜s)‖Mds+ ‖A
pi
t,Tgτ (·; νT )−A
p˜i
t,Tgτ (·; ν˜T )‖M
≤
∫ T
t
‖Apit,sfτ,s(·, πs(·); νs)−A
p˜i
t,sfτ,s(·, πs(·); ν˜s)‖Mds
+
∫ T
t
‖Ap˜it,sfτ,s(·, πs(·); νs)−A
p˜i
t,sfτ,s(·, π˜s(·); ν˜s)‖Mds
+‖Apit,Tgτ (·; νT )−A
p˜i
t,Tgτ (·; νT )‖M + ‖A
p˜i
t,Tgτ (·; νT )−A
p˜i
t,Tgτ (·; ν˜T )‖M
≤ K(T + 1) sup
t≤s≤T
d(νs, ν˜s) +K
∫ T
t
‖Θs,s − Θ˜s,s‖Mds.
Using Grownwall’s inequality, one can see that there exists a κ3 > 0
sup
0≤τ≤T
sup
0≤t≤T
‖Θτ,t − Θ˜τ,t‖M ≤ κ3 sup
0≤t≤T
d(νt, ν˜t).
Now we are ready to present the main theorem of this paper.
Theorem 3.11. Under Assumption (A), (B), (C), if κ1κ2κ3T < 1, there exists a unique
time-inconsistent distribution-dependent equilibrium (ρ, π∗) ∈ P ×D([0, T ],M).
Proof. By (3.11), we have
sup
0≤s≤T
sup
0≤τ≤T
‖Θ(3)τ,s −Θ
(2)
τ,s‖M ≤ κ3 sup
0≤s≤T
d(ν(3)s , ν
(2)
s ).
By (2.5) and Assumption (B), we have
sup
0≤s≤T
d(ν(3)s , ν
(2)
s )ds ≤ κ1
∫ T
0
dU(π
(2)
s , π
(1)
s )ds
≤ κ1κ2
∫ T
0
‖Θ(2)t,t −Θ
(1)
t,t ‖Mds
≤ κ1κ2T sup
0≤s≤T
sup
0≤τ≤T
‖Θ(2)τ,s −Θ
(1)
τ,s‖M.
Thus we have
sup
0≤s≤T
sup
0≤τ≤T
‖Θ(3)τ,s −Θ
(2)
τ,s‖M ≤ κ1κ2κ3T sup
0≤s≤T
sup
0≤τ≤T
‖Θ(2)τ,s −Θ
(1)
τ,s‖M.
If κ1κ2κ3T < 1, we can easily see that Θ
(n)
τ,t is a Cauchy sequence with limit Θ
∗
τ,t and ν
(n)
T
is
a Cauchy sequence in C([0, T ],P) with limit νT. At the same time, we can get a pair (ρ, π
∗)
where
θ∗t (i) := Θ
∗
t,t(i) and π
∗ = ψ[θ∗] ∈ D([0, T ],M).
By Lemma 3.9, (ρ, π∗) is the time-inconsistent distribution-dependent equilibrium.
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Remark 3.12. We have established the time-inconsistent mean-field equilibrium for
general cases. If the functions J and V in the cost function J in (3.1) are independent of
the distribution, such problem reduces to the classical time-inconsistent control problem for
Markov chains. Then by Theorem 3.7, one can find the time-inconsistent equilibrium π∗
which is independent of the choice ρ. Moreover, the assumption on the constants κ1, κ2, κ3
and T are no longer needed.
4 Time-inconsistent Infinite-player Mean-field Game
In this section, we will introduce an infinite-player game of which the mean-field equilibrium
is equivalent to the time-inconsistent distribution-dependent equilibrium defined in Defini-
tion 3.1.
On a complete probability measure space {Ω,P,F}, consider a finite-state controlled
Markov with state space M and transition probability
P(Xt+∆t = j|Xt = i; v) =
{
qvt (i, j)∆t+ o(∆t),
1 + qvt (i, i)∆t + o(∆t)
where v is taken in some action space U . Denote N = {1, . . . , N} and T = [0, T ].
Let {Xn
T
: n ∈ N} be the dynamics of N -independent players with the same transition as
{XT} and differential initials. Let the empirical measure process ρ
N,−k
T
be
ρ
N,−k
t (i;ω) =
1
N − 1
∑
n 6=k
I[Xnt (ω) = i].
Let the set of admissible strategies L1([0, T ],U) be similarly defined as before andDN([0, T ],U)
be the set of all admissible strategies for N players.
A classical mean-field game problem is to find a Nash equilibrium πN = π1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ πN ∈
UN[0, T ] such that
(4.1) Jˆkt (i, φt[π
k]; ρN,−k
T
) ≤ Jˆkt (i, φt[π
ε]; ρN,−k
T
) for any πε ∈ L1([0, T ],U)
and Jˆkt is the cost functional for player k defined as
(4.2) Jˆkt (i, φt[π
k]; ρN,−k
T
) = E
[ ∫ T
t
fˆks (X
k
s , π
k
s (X
k
s ); ρ
N,−k
s )ds+ gˆ
k(XkT ; ρ
N,−k
T )
∣∣Xkt = i, πN]
for some appropriate fˆk and gˆk.
Different from (4.2), we suppose the cost function for each player is in the same form cor-
responding with their dynamics respectively with an additional non-exponential discounting
factor τ in the form of
Jkτ,t(i, φt[π
k]; ρN,−k
T
) = E
[ ∫ T
t
fτ,s(X
k
s , π
k
s (X
k
s ); ρ
N,−k
s )ds+ gτ (X
k
T ; ρ
N,−k
T )
∣∣Xkt = i, π].
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for some appropriate f and g. Here every player is assumed to make their decisions accord-
ing to the same time-inconsistent cost functional. Because of the time-inconsistency, it is
impossible to find the equilibrium strategy which verifies (4.1). Thus for such a game, we
aim to find a time-inconsistent N -player strategy in the following sense.
Definition 4.1. An N -player strategy πN = π1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ πN ∈ DN([0, T ],U) is called a
time-inconsistent equilibrium if
lim inf
ε→0+
Jkt,t(i, π
ε ⊕ φt+ε[π
k]; ρN,−k
T
)− Jkt,t(i, φt[π
k]; ρN,−k
T
)
ε
≥ 0
for any k ∈ N and πε ∈ D([t, t+ ε),U).
The N -player equilibrium can be understood in the following way. Consider a player
ℓ, if it is assumed that the strategies of the other players are known from the equilibrium,
the strategy of player ℓ finds in the time-inconsistent control problem, coincides with player
ℓ’s strategy determined in the equilibrium. The above equilibrium essentially indicates that
with all the strategies of the other players fixed, the ℓ-player’s strategy is locally optimal.
Let N →∞, i.e., the number of the players tends to infinity, and suppose that ρN,−k0 → γ
for any k. It can be seen that all the players are equivalent in such game. Thus we can
conclude that every player should obey the same strategy π. By the law of large numbers,
ρ
N,−k
T
converges to the curve µγ,pi
T
determined by
dµt
dt
= µtQ
pit
t with µ0 = γ.
In this case the equilibrium is fully determined by (γ, π) since every player is equivalent
in such time-inconsistent mean-field game. It is not difficult to see that (γ, π) coincides with
that in Definition 3.1. In this sense, we can call the equilibrium defined in Definition 3.1 a
time-inconsistent mean-field equilibrium too.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have explored the time-inconsistent distribution-dependent control problem for continuous-
time controlled Markov chains. Due to the time-inconsistency and distribution-dependence
of the cost functional, the problems have some unique interesting features. We show that the
equilibrium we find is essentially equivalent to the equilibrium of an infinite-player game with
time-inconsistent distribution-dependent cost. Moreover, if the cost function is in the clas-
sical form, the time-inconsistent mean-field equilibrium coincides with the time-inconsistent
equilibrium for distribution-independent model.
It appears to be possible to improve the results from several angles. For example, can
we consider similar problem if the state space is countable? Can time delay be incorporated
in the setup. All of these deserve further investigations.
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